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 1 
THE HISTORY OF COMITY  
Thomas Schultz* and Jason Mitchenson** 
The principle of comity has received little modern academic attention.  Its history, even less 
so.1  What academic work there is has generally sought to understand the principle by reference 
to its use in practice – an application of what common law scholars refer to as the case method.  
To be sure, the case method is an effective way to distill general principles of law. Yet, by itself, 
it is limited. Rather like looking at a painting through a straw, it prevents us from seeing the 
whole picture. 
This article explores the history of comity through events and the ideas of those who 
most influenced its development. By doing so, a number of important aspects may be revealed 
about the principle which have been hidden from view. This may shed new light on comity and 
open the door to new ways of thinking about the principle. 
Comity was created to resolve the vexed question of how, and under what 
circumstances, sovereign States ought to recognize each other’s authority. Although originally 
developed as a means to facilitate international trade and commerce, it became a principle of 
justice.  States act with, or ought to act, with comity because the recognition of foreign authority 
will, in many cases, be the most just exercise of their own. The principle embodies the idea that 
whereas every State is sovereign, often the most just exercise of one State’s own authority will 
in fact be to recognize the authority of another. 
The history explored here is a simplification and cannot fully or accurately describe the 
diversity and complexity of the events and ideas presented. As with any historical enquiry, the 
search for truth is not an easy task. Often we must negotiate between contending versions of 
past events and competing interpretations of historical works. For this reason, the historical 
enquiry presented here should not be read as a claim that these events or ideas were universally 
accepted or uniformly conceived, but only that they were all – to varying degrees – influential 
in the development of comity. 
 
The Events Leading to Comity 
 
The birth of comity is connected to the birth of the modern State system.  By all accounts, the 
events leading to the creation of comity are the same as those leading to the creation of 
sovereignty – only told from a different perspective. It is a shared history, one marked by the 
brutality of the Thirty Years War and the rise of the sovereign State. 
 
A Fragmented World 
 
 Following the collapse of the Western Roman Empire in 476, Rome’s centralized 
government was replaced by a network of smaller semi-autonomous communities. Although 
these communities were not “States” as we would think of them today, they did enjoy a level 
of autonomy previously unimaginable. Some later would develop more organized forms of 
government on the basis of their mutual Christian beliefs. This spiritual union, combined with 
the later military intervention of the Crusades, resulted in profound changes to the European 
political-legal landscape. It also brought two new powerful actors to the forefront of European 
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politics – the Pope and the Emperor – both of whom aspired to the civitas Christiana which 
entailed an authority superior to all.2 
When the Holy Roman Empire was established in 800, Charlemagne (742-814) 
acknowledged the universal authority of the Papacy. But 34 years later the new Emperor, Louis 
I (778-840), would challenge papal authority. The Pope defended the Papacy with the two 
swords doctrine under which God was said to have delegated his power over spiritual and 
temporal matters directly to the Papacy. The Emperor, on the other hand, asserted that although 
this was true in respect of spiritual matters, God delegated his power over temporal matters to 
the Emperor. Later, under the influence of Peter Damian (1007-1073), a compromise was 
reached, yet the relationship between the Papacy and Emperor was never amicable as each 
sought to expand its power.3 
As these actors entered the Middle Ages, there was a constant struggle for power. Two 
main power relations characterized this time period. The first was horizontal, between the 
Papacy and the Holy Roman Emperor; whereas the second was vertical, between the 
Papacy/Holy Roman Emperor and the multitude of new semi-autonomous communities that 
had sprung up all over Europe. Even at a local level these communities fought for power and 
resources.4 
Despite the Papacy’s continual effort until the thirteenth century to impose its plenitudo 
potestatis, it was never fully recognized by some of the more powerful monarchs in Europe.  
France and Spain never accepted feudal vassalage, and England repudiated Papal overlordship 
in 1366.5 Then, in 1517, Martin Luther (1483-1546) nailed his Ninety-Five Theses to the door 
of the Schlosskirche in Wittenberg, setting in motion the Protestant Reformation. Rejecting 
many traditional teachings of the Late Medieval Church, Luther dealt a lethal blow to the Pope’s 
hope for universal authority.6 
As the authority of the Papacy declined, so did the authority of the Emperor. The Great 
Interregnum (1254-1273) provided the perfect opportunity for the Princes of the Holy Roman 
Empire to assert their growing independence. By the fourteenth century, authority over 
temporal matters ceased to be considered within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Emperor as 
more power transferred to local rulers.7 The Emperor’s de jure overlordship was solidified by 
the work of jurists such as Bartolus (1313-1357) and Baldus (1327-1400), the authority of the 
Princes being seen as independent with a certain level of self-determination – rex in regno suo 
est imperator regni sui.8 
England, France, Spain and certain Italian cities – such as Genoa, Florence, Pisa and 
Venice – all asserted their own authority in competition with the Emperor.  Largely succeeding, 
they effectively replaced the Emperor’s universal authority over temporal matters with the 
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concept of distinct self-governing communities. Lacking a strong economic or military base, 
the Emperor had no means by which to fold these communities back into the Empire. The 
constant struggle for power between the Papacy and successive Emperors created a power 
vacuum which allowed these new self-governing communities to thrive. The brooding tension 
between the Papacy, Holy Roman Emperor and now certain feudal monarchs, Princes, and free 
cities as to the appropriate scope of each party’s competing, and often incompatible, claims of 
authority became highly explosive.9 
Things only got worse for the Emperor as certain German principalities also began to 
break away from the Empire. Increasingly large concessions were made in favor of the more 
powerful German Princes and some revolted against the Empire by siding with the Protestants 
in emerging conflicts. These conflicts were ultimately settled by the Treaty of Augsburg in 
1555, which established the principle of cujus regio, ejus religio allowing the Princes to 
determine the religion of their respective territories – the only two acceptable choices at the 
time being Catholicism or Lutheranism. The Treaty effectively reaffirmed the independence 
these Princes and directly contributed to the creation and formal recognition of distinct self-
governing communities within the Empire.10 
 
The Consequence of Overlapping Authority 
 
It was not long before the Treaty of Augsburg lost its purpose. The Emperor and Princes 
interpreted it to their own convenience, and the Lutherans never considered it more than a 
temporary accord. The rise of Calvinism throughout Europe added a third major worldview of 
the Christian religion but was afforded no recognition in the Treaty.11 
Tensions heightened when Emperor Rudolf II (1576-1612) decided in 1607 to re-
establish Roman Catholicism in Donauwörth, and the Imperial Diet decided in 1608 that 
renewal of the Treaty of Augsburg was to be conditional upon the restoration of all Catholic 
church lands appropriated since 1552. In response, Protestants formed the Evangelical Union 
(1608) under the leadership of Fredrick V (1596-1632) of the Palatinate. Catholics, responded 
in kind, forming the Catholic League (1609) under the leadership of Maximilian of Bavaria 
(1573-1651). Although both coalitions formed in Germanic regions, they were soon joined by 
foreign forces.  On one hand, England and the United Netherlands sided with the Protestants.  
The Evangelical Union even obtained the support of Henri IV (1553-1610) of France (despite 
the fact that he was Catholic), who saw an opportunity to further French interests.  On the other 
hand, the Catholic League obtained the support of the Emperor’s cousin, Philip III (1578-1621), 
the King of Spain.12 
The increasingly large number of powerful actors, each with different religious and 
political interests, combined with the multitude of overlapping claims of authority made the 
Thirty Years War inevitable.13 The spark was struck in 1618 at the Defenestration of Prague, 
when a group of Protestants invaded the Imperial Palace and threw two Catholic members of 
the Bohemian Council out the window. The following series of wars are cumulatively known 
as the Thirty Years War – the most devastating and destructive conflict in Europe until World 
War I. As David Sturdy notes, the Thirty Years War “acquired a momentum which for almost 
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three decades resisted … political control”.14 The sheer number of actors, the length of time, 
and the brutality of the war can all be understood as the inevitable consequence of an 
increasingly complex multi-layered mess of political, secular and spiritual authority. 
The Defenestration of Prague was a reaction against the closing of Protestant chapels 
by Catholic officials in Bohemia.  King Ferdinand (1578-1637) of Styria, a devout Catholic, 
sought to impose religious uniformity in Bohemia by forcing Roman Catholicism on its people. 
Given the relatively large number of Protestants in the city, Ferdinand’s unpopularity soon 
caused the Bohemian Revolt. Taking control of the government within a month, the Protestants 
disposed of Ferdinand as King of Bohemia and revolved against the authority of the Emperor 
and Catholicism. The Emperor attempted to repress the Protestant rebels and thus the first two 
years of the Thirty Years War were known simply as the Bohemian War. Unfortunately for the 
Emperor, Frederick V (1596-1632), the leader of the Evangelical Union, quickly joined the 
Bohemian Rebel and was later crowned King of Bohemia.15 
Following the events of the Bohemian War, Ferdinand remained a staunch supporter of 
the Catholic League, and when he succeeded Matthias (1557-1619) as Holy Roman Emperor 
in 1619 he was determined to reclaim Bohemia. With the support of the Catholic League, the 
King of Spain and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Ferdinand quashed Frederick V and 
his Bohemian rebels and ordered the re-conversion of Bohemia to Catholicism.16 
By this time, fighting had spilled well beyond Bohemia. Into the conflict poured new 
combatants – various German Princes, Denmark, France, Sweden, the United Netherlands, and 
Spain.17 All of Europe was involved in what would ultimately become the Thirty Years War. 
As the war moved into its second and then third decade, it became increasingly untamed. 
Religious affiliations were soon forgotten and events became “so confused that people no 
longer knew why or against whom they were fighting”.18 
In no time at all, the Thirty Years War had turned into a dreadful massacre of hordes of 
ill-paid solders from countries far and wide who rampaged throughout the lands, looting and 
killing. Although statistics are hard to come by, the Thirty Years War devastated entire regions 
and bankrupted most of the combatants. In certain regions, population losses reached as high 
as 75%. Moving troops and battle fronts, combined with the displacement of civilian 
populations, led to further disease and famine. By the end, there was a desperate need to end 
the bloodshed.19 
 
Rise of the Sovereign State 
 
 In 1648, in the cities of Münster and Osnabrück, the Thirty Years War finally ended 
with the signing of the Treaties of Westphalia. The peace negotiations involved a total of 109 
delegations representing various European powers, including the Holy Roman Emperor, Philip 
IV of Spain, the Kingdom of France, the Swedish Empire, the United Netherlands, the German 
Princes, and the free imperial cities. Spain and the Netherlands also signed a separate Treaty 
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approximately ten months earlier to end their Eighty Years War which had run parallel to the 
Thirty Years War.20 
It is a founding myth that the Treaties sought to establish a New World Order – one 
based on mutual agreement that all States would be sovereign.21 In truth, the Treaties reveal no 
such grand political aspiration. To a large extent they were technical documents relating 
primarily to the redistribution of lands within Europe. Yet they did require that all the parties 
recognize a modified version of the Treaty of Augsburg, which permitted local rulers to 
determine the religion of their territories – the options now being Catholicism, Lutheranism, or 
Calvinism.22 
Thus, it is within the Treaties that we find the seed of modern sovereignty. Yet, it is the 
events leading to their signing, rather than the Treaties themselves, which appear to have been 
the primary motivation for adopting the principle of sovereignty as the central pillar of the 
modern State system. The Treaties sought to end the brutality of the Thirty Years War by 
removing the catalyst that started it all – namely, by giving each party the right to self-
determination and non-interference with respect to religious matters within their territory. 
In De jure belli ac pacis Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) wrote that the brutality of the Thirty 
Years War led him to reflect on the idea of sovereignty as the basis for his international 
community of States. For Grotius, the concept of sovereignty was built on the idea that “good 
fences make good neighbours”. By compartmentalising State authority and removing the 
possibility of overlaps, Grotius believed the principle of sovereignty would contribute to a more 
peaceful Europe.23 
This compartmentalisation of authority never truly matched the realities of socio-
economic life. Whereas the authority of States could be restrained to certain boundaries, people 
could not. People continued to travel to foreign lands. There they acquired property, entered 
into contracts, committed crimes, and suffered injury. Yet, legal relations that arose in one State 
were of no effect in another. Sovereignty meant that no State was required to recognize the laws 
or legal judgements of foreign States within their territory. As international trade increased and 
disputes with foreign elements became more frequent, there was a need to create a principle 
that could soften the sharp edge of sovereignty – a principle that would regulate the recognition 
of foreign authority without jeopardizing the peace. Quite simply, there was a need for comity. 
 
The Concept of Comity 
 
The creation of comity coincided with a period of radical international change. New States 
emerging within their own territorial boundaries were resisting any claims of authority superior 
to their own. The brutality of the Thirty Years War, combined with the work of jurists such as 
Jean Bodin (1530-1596) and Hugo Grotius, all contributed to the growing absolutism of 
sovereignty and its place at the center of this Westphalian system. 
One State which asserted its sovereignty with force was the United Netherlands. After 
the conclusion of the Thirty Years War – which ran parallel to its Eighty Years War with Spain 
– the United Netherlands was recognized as independent from the Spanish Crown. In the years 
that followed, the United Netherlands enjoyed unprecedented prosperity as it became one of 
the world’s foremost trading nations. It quickly became apparent that its success and prosperity 
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depended upon its ability to continue trading within this new system of sovereign States.  It was 
thus imperative for the Dutch to develop a means by which they could recognize foreign law 
and judgements so that legal relations created abroad would be recognized and enforced at 
home. 
The Dutch were not the first to wrestle with the idea of conflicting legal orders. The 
Statutists had developed a principle-based approach to resolve legal conflicts between free 
cities and provinces in Italy as early as the thirteenth century.  But their approach was developed 
well before the principle of sovereignty crystallized in Europe, and it became apparent that this 
was insufficient to resolve conflicts of authority between sovereign States.  
In response, Dutch jurists, working during or immediately after the Thirty Years War, 
broke away from the Statutist tradition. Relying, to varying degrees, on the twin concepts of 
sovereignty and comity, they developed a new means by which to resolve conflicts of authority 
and minimize inconsistent legal treatment. The origins of comity must therefore be understood 
as a reaction to these changing forces – the rise of the sovereign State, the need to promote 
international commerce, and the inability of the Statutist approach to resolve conflicts of 
authority within this new Westphalian political-legal framework. 
For the Dutch School, comity was a means of reconcile two competing paradigms – the 
political need for sovereignty and the commercial need to promote international commerce.  
The central idea behind their work was that States can or ought to (depending on the jurist) act 
with comity to recognise foreign authority within their territory because international commerce 
contributes to the prosperity of all nations. The idea that States ought to act with comity “for 
reasons of justice” was not developed until later, when the principle was exported to and 
developed within the common law tradition. 
In the United States, Justice Joseph Story (1779-1845) saw comity as an attractive 
principle for developing a new system of conflict rules for the American context. As was the 
case in the United Netherlands, Story sought to reconcile the political need for sovereignty with 
the commercial need to promote international commerce. In adapting it for the American 
context, Story focused on comity’s concern with justice – an idea given little attention by Dutch 
scholars. To Story, States ought to act with comity to recognize foreign law, not only because 
it promotes international commerce, but also because it furthers each State’s paramount duty to 
do justice. 
The idea that States ought to act with comity for reasons of justice was developed in 
England, where the legal context was substantially different from the United Netherlands and 
even that of the United States. When comity was received in England, that country was already 
a major trading nation and Englishmen commonly travelled to foreign shores. However, at the 
time, English courts were precluded from recognizing foreign law, meaning that they were 
required to either withhold relief in all cases with a foreign element or simply apply English 
law. 
To remedy this situation, William Murray, First Lord Mansfield (1705-1793), adopted 
the principle of comity to permit English courts to recognize foreign law and judicial acts in 
circumstances where it would be just to do so. In the process of adapting it for the English 
common law tradition, Mansfield reconceptualized comity as a principle concerned primarily 
with interests of justice. For Mansfield, States ought to act with comity to recognize authority, 
not because it is commercially beneficial for States, but because it will often be more just that 
a dispute should be resolved subject to foreign rather than domestic law. 
The remainder of this article provides an account for this claim. Beginning with the 
Statutists and the response of the Dutch School, we trace the development of comity from 






 Prior to the creation of free cities in Europe, there was no need for comity. The dominant 
ideology of the Roman Empire was the concept of imperium sine fine, which demanded the 
integration and assimilation of other territories into the Empire. Given the Roman conception 
of justice as absolute and universal, Roman jurists considered it impossible that justice could 
be done by recognizing foreign law. The Roman idea of “international order was simply the 
universalisation of the Roman order – a homogenisation of law”.24 
By the time of the Italian Renaissance (c. 1330-1550), an expansion in trade between 
different Italian and European cities had led to an increase in the number of disputes that 
contained a foreign element. The heritage of these cities meant that they adopted Roman law as 
their natural “common law”. As they broke away from the Empire, they developed their own 
local laws to reflect their unique cultures and interests leading to substantive differences over 
time. This development created a unique problem not previously addressed by Roman jurists.25 
At a practical level, the existence of different legal orders required jurists to develop a 
method to resolve conflicts of authority and inconsistent treatment. At a theoretical level, it 
required jurists to confront a more difficult problem – the idea that there may be more than one 
conception of justice. If each city’s legal systems was an interpretation of Roman law, then 
theoretically each had to be considered as reflecting a valid idea of “justice”. Private 
international law – and later, comity as part thereof – developed to address this problem. It was 
created to minimize the potential for conflict and inconsistent treatment by determining which 
set of laws – or more specifically, which conception of justice – ought to apply to resolve which 
types of disputes.26 
The first idea of private international law was probably developed by the Statutists, who 
considered each statute – or law – to naturally belong to one of two categories: (1) personal; or 
(2) territorial. Under the Statutist approach, if a statute was personal it attached to the person 
and applied outside the territory of the relevant local authority – be that a Prince, Monarch, or 
some other ruler. If a statute was territorial, it attached to the land and applied to all persons 
within the territorial boundaries of the relevant local authority. Any court dealing with a dispute 
was therefore required to apply the “applicable law” by reference to the personality of the 
parties and the place of the disputed action or thing.27 
The Statutists sought to address the injustice caused by conflicting legal orders by 
developing a principle-based approach by which to determine which set of laws should apply 
in any given context. The idea was that disputes could be resolved most justly by choosing that 
set of laws which were most “natural”.  As great as this methodology might have seemed at the 
time, its limitations became apparent as differences in substantive law became greater and 
disputes that contained a foreign elements became more frequent and complex. Over time it 
became increasingly difficult to categorize laws as personal or territorial. The division of law 
into one of two categories was insufficient; a third “mixed” category was added to classify those 
statutes that did not “naturally” fall into either.28 
However, as time passed, people became increasingly attached to the land. As a result, 
theories in support of the authority of local rulers began to emerge with greater force.  In France, 
for example, Bertrand d’Argentré (1519-1590) argued for a presumption in favor of classifying 
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laws as territorial.29 To d’Argentré, laws were to be classified as personal or mixed only in 
exceptional cases. Jean Bodin (1530-1596) and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) took this idea 
further, arguing that sovereignty necessarily implied that all laws were inherently territorial. In 
Les six livres de la republique30 Bodin argued that sovereign States enjoyed “absolute and 
perpetual power” within their territory, meaning that no State could be subject to the will of any 
other. And, in De jure belli ac pacis,31 Grotius argued for a community of formally equal States 
built upon a similar conception of sovereignty. 
Over time the progressive adoption of the Westphalian system begat the more complete 
conceptualized view that State authority extended no further than its territorial boundaries and 
that no State was subject to the authority of any other.32 The brutality of the Thirty Years War, 
combined with the works of d’Argentré, Bodin, and Grotius, all contributed to the progressive 
absolutism of sovereignty and the view that States enjoyed absolute control over all things, 
persons, and transactions within their territory. Whereas Grotius did not write directly on the 
subject of private international law, his conception of sovereignty would later be considered the 
starting point for all thinking on public and private international law. Perhaps most importantly, 
his theory was promptly accepted in the United Netherlands, where Dutch jurists were wrestling 
with the problem of how to promote international commerce within this new system of 
sovereign States who incurred no duty to recognize each other’s authority within their territory. 
 
The Dutch School 
 
 Dutch jurists working during and after the Thirty Years War were all indoctrinated in 
the civil law tradition and the teachings of their Statutist predecessors. Yet their work represents 
a break from the Statutist tradition in favour of a new basis for resolving conflicts of authority 
between sovereign States – namely, the principle of comity. 
There are several reasons why comity originated in the United Netherlands. First, by 
the time the Dutch School came to consider the question of conflicting legal orders, Dutch 
jurists had accepted and elaborated upon the work of Bodin and Grotius. After the Thirty Years 
War – which coincided with its Eight Years War against Spain – the United Netherlands was 
recognized as independent from the Spanish Crown. The concept of sovereignty found 
particular favor with Dutch jurists during this time because it reinforced the United Netherlands 
claim to independence, self-determination, and non-interference against Spain and other foreign 
powers.33 
Second, in the years following its independence, the United Netherlands enjoyed a 
period of prosperity as it became a foremost trading nation. After the Thirty Years War, few 
European powers were in a position to capitalize on the peace. However, the United 
Netherlands was, and when it signed the 1648 Treaty of Münster to end its Eight Years War 
with Spain, the treaty was concluded on highly favorable terms. The revolution against the 
Spanish ushered in a golden age, and the United Netherlands became the first modern European 
State. Within a generation, the United Netherlands was the most progressive major power in 
Europe. With the collapse of the Papacy and Holy Roman Emperor’s plans for universal 
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authority and internal disorder in France, Germany, and England, it established commercial 
trading hubs in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Americas.34 
But it became apparent that the prosperity of the United Netherlands depended upon its 
ability to continue trading within this new system of sovereign States. And, while the doctrine 
of sovereignty had led to peace in Europe, it was impeding international commerce. The 
compartmentalisation of State authority meant that legal relations arising abroad were incapable 
of being recognized and enforced at home. This problem attracted the attention of jurists who 
began to contemplate the grounds on which recognition of foreign law and judicial acts within 
the United Netherlands might be justified.35 
Third, the political-legal climate in the United Netherlands was favorable for reflecting 
on questions of private international law. The United Netherlands was a loose federation which 
had combined as if they were one province for its defence against Spain. However, Article I of 
the Union of Utrecht36 stipulated that although the provinces were to unite for this common 
purpose, the traditional privileges and rights of each were not to be diminished. This 
decentralized regime, combined with the fierce independence of the provinces, provided a 
fertile breeding ground for reflecting on private international law. The Dutch needed a means 
to resolve both inter-national and intra-national conflicts of authority that arose between 
sovereign States and provinces.37 
Fourth, by this time, it was evident that the Statutist approach was incapable of resolving 
conflicts between sovereign States. Italian and French jurists wrestling with the question since 
the thirteenth century wrote before the doctrine of sovereignty crystallized in Europe. Their 
approach did not account for Europe’s changed political-legal landscape. As the opportunity 
for contact and business outside of one’s own territory increased, so did the complexity of the 
questions confronted by the Statutists. Accelerated commerce and movement between States 
wore down the hard lines of Statutism, and as the doctrine grew more complex, it began drawing 
distinctions that seemed arbitrary and “unnatural”.38 
Comity’s origins must therefore be understood as a reaction to these changing forces – 
the progressive adoption of the doctrine of sovereignty, the need to promote commerce between 
sovereign States and independent provinces, and the inability of the Statutist approach to 
resolve conflicts of authority between sovereign States. Taking their cue from Jean Bodin and 
Hugo Grotius, the Dutch School thus sought to address the vexed problem of how to reconcile 
the commercial need to recognize foreign authority with the political need to uphold the 
doctrine of sovereignty. 
 
Paulus and Johannes Voet 
 
Paulus Voet (1619-1667) was the first to suggest that States may recognize foreign law comiter.  
Accepting the political need for sovereignty, Voet considered all States to be equal and law to 
be inherently territorial. Yet, he had one foot within the Statutist tradition, considering there to 
be nine exceptions which he traced back to Roman law.39 The first eight were nothing new, but 
his ninth was the idea that States could, if they so chose, recognize foreign law comiter.40 
                                                        
34 Ibid; Friedrich Juenger, Choice of Law and Multistate Justice (2005), p. 19. 
35 Yntema, note 1 above, pp. 18-19. 
36 Unie van Utrecht (1579). 
37 Yntema, note 1 above, pp. 17–19; Beale, note 29 above, p. 38. 
38 Joel Paul, "The Transformation of International Comity", Law and Contemporary Problems, LXXI (2008), pp. 
21-22; Ernest Lorenzen, "Story’s Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws: One Hundred Years After",  Harvard 
Law Review, XLVIII (1934), pp. 16-17. 
39 Yntema, note 1 above, pp. 22-23. 
40 Pauli Voet, De statutis eorumque concursu liber singularis (1661), transl. H. Yntema, Sect. IV, Cap. II, 17 in 
ibid., p. 23. 
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To Voet, the principle of sovereignty meant that no State could exercise authority over 
another. The logical implication then was that any recognition of foreign law had to be 
completely within the discretion of each State. In De statutis eorumque concursu liber 
singularis,41 Voet developed his conception of comity as a discretionary principle States could 
use to recognize foreign law. He made clear that the primacy of sovereignty meant that there 
was no obligation to do so – it happens, but it need not happen.42 
Voet touched on the idea that States recognize foreign law for reasons of justice –
aequitate as he put it.43 Just as his Statutist predecessors, he understood that, in any one case, 
there may be competing conceptions of justice and that often justice might better be done if 
States recognize foreign law rather than apply their own. Yet, a literal reading of his work 
suggests that Voet’s primary concerns were governmental in nature. True, the recognition of 
foreign law may further interests of justice in certain cases. But States do not recognize foreign 
law “for reasons of justice”. They do so because it is in their mutual interest – namely, because 
this promotes international commerce without derogating from each State’s sovereign right to 
self-determination and non-interference. The idea that States ought to act with comity “for 
reasons of justice” was not developed until later. 
Paulus Voet’s idea of comity was more eloquently endorsed by his son, Johannes Voet 
(1647-1713).  In Commentarius ad pandectas44 Johannes Voet added little to his father’s 
original idea but, through his succinct writing style, he advanced his father’s conception of 
comity as a discretionary principle.45 Considering all law to be inherently territorial, and all 
States to be sovereign, Johannes Voet believed any recognition of foreign authority to be within 
the discretion of each State. It is true, he noted, that the courts of one State may refuse to assume 
jurisdiction where the same action is already pending abroad, they may recognize foreign law 
or give effect to foreign judgements within their territory. But, when they do so, this is done 
only out of convenience and mutual utility. Just as his father, he made it clear that no State is 





 In the interval between the key works of Paulus and Johannes Voet, another basis for 
resolving conflicts of authority between sovereign State was advanced by Ulrik Huber (1636-
1694). Huber, a Professor at the University of Franeker and a member of the Court of Appeal 
in Friesland, sought to supplement the work of Grotius, who did not explore the issue. Huber’s 
enormous reputation extended well beyond Friesland, attracting many students from Holland, 
Germany, and Scotland. He is generally considered the father of comity, and his conception of 
the principle would later migrate to the United States and England, where it became 
instrumental in the development of many common law conflict of law rules.47 
                                                        
41 Pauli Voet, De statutis eorumque concursu liber singularis (1661). 
42 Pauli Voet, De statutis eorumque concursu liber singularis (1661), transl. Alan Watson, Sect. IV, Cap. III, 15 
in Alan Watson, Joseph Story and the Comity of Errors: A Case Study in Conflict of Laws (1992), p. 15. 
43 Ibid., Sect. IV, Cap. II, 17. 
44 Johannis Voet, Commentarius ad pandectas (1829), IV. 
45 Watson, note 42 above, pp. 15-16; Yntema, note 1 above, pp. 13–14; Roeland Kollewijn, Geschiedenis van de 
Nederlandse wetenschap van het internationaal privaatrecht tot 1880 (1937). 
46 Yntema, note 1 above, p. 24; Watson, note 42 above, p. 16. 
47 Yntema, note 1 above, p. 25; Watson, note 42 above, pp. 1-3. 
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In De conflictu legum,48 Huber articulated three “axioms” as the basis of his new theory 
of private international law. which he considered self-evident and not open to question: 
 
1. the laws of each State have force within the boundaries of the State, and bind all 
subjects to it, but not beyond (Digest 2.1.20); 
2. all persons within the limits of a State, whether they live there permanently or 
temporarily, are deemed to be subjects thereof (Digest 48.22.7.10); 
3. States will act by way of comity, so that the laws of every State, having been 
applied within its own boundaries, should retain their effect everywhere so far as 
they do not cause prejudice to the powers or rights of such States or of its 
subjects.49 
 
 Huber’s first two axioms continue the progressive trend towards absolute territorial 
sovereignty. Yet, in describing sovereign authority, Huber takes the idea further than the Voets, 
rejecting what remained of the Statutist approach by arguing that all laws are inherently 
territorial. Instead, his theory of private international law derived solely from the twin concepts 
of sovereignty and comity.50 
The pertinent question is whether Huber’s conception of comity differs from that 
advanced by the Voets, and if so, how. There are, we suggest, a number of possible 
interpretations of Huber’s third axiom. On one hand, some scholars consider Huber’s comity to 
be no different to that advanced by the Voets. This has led them to consider Paulus Voet, rather 
than Huber, to be the true father of comity.51 Indeed some of Huber’s writing suggests that 
indeed he did intend his third axiom to be discretionary in much the same way – the most 
notable being the lack of authority he provides for his third axiom compared to axioms one and 
two.  In laying down his first two axioms Huber based them on Roman law – Digest 2.1.20 and 
Digest 48.22.7.10 respectively – suggesting that they form part of the ius gentium. After the 
conclusion of the 1648 Treaties of Westphalia, and the acceptance of the principle of 
sovereignty expounded by Bodin and Grotius, these two axioms reflected State practice and 
could hardly be argued with. But, in laying down his third axiom, Huber neglected any reference 
to Roman law (and thus the universality of the ius gentium). There is an argument then that 
Huber never intended his third axiom to form part of the ius gentium.52 Comity was simply 
“common sense” because it facilitated international commerce within the political-legal 
framework laid down by axioms one and two. 
On the other hand, some of Huber’s work suggests that he may have conceived of 
comity as obligatory in nature. For the Voets, sovereignty is supreme, the necessary implication 
being that no State is obliged to act with comity – it happens because it is commercially 
desirable, but need not happen. Huber, however, appeared to conceiving of comity not as an 
exception to sovereignty, but rather as a necessarily corollary of it. To Huber, comity flows 
naturally from sovereignty so that each makes the other work. This suggests that he may have 
considered States to have an obligation to act with comity – a proposition supported by his use 
of the word will, rather than can or should, in axiom three. Indeed, nowhere in his work does 
                                                        
48 Published as Vol II, Book I, Tit iii of Ulrik Huber, Praelectiones juris romani et hodierni (1735). For the 
original Latin, with English translation, see Ernest Lorenzen, "Huber’s De Conflictu Legum", Illinois Law 
Review, XIII (1918), pp. 199, 375. 
49 Lorenzen, note 48 above, p. 227. 
50 Childress, note 32 above, p. 20; Lorenzen, note 48 above, p. 137; Juenger, note 34 above, p. 20; Winston 
Nagan and Aitza Haddad, "Sovereignty in Theory and Practice", San Diego International Law Journal, XIII 
(2012), pp. 429, 395. 
51 Kollewijn, note 45 above; Lainé, note 29 above. 
52 Watson, note 42 above, p. 4. 
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Huber indicate a situation in which a State has a choice not to act with comity, and he certainty 
does not cite the Voets.53 
If this interpretation is correct, what is the source of a State’s obligation to act with 
comity? Does not sovereignty imply complete control over all matters within one’s territory, 
including whether a State will act with comity? There are, we suggest, two possible sources for 
Huber’s obligation to act with comity. First, it is possible that Huber considered all three of his 
axioms to form part of the ius gentium. Several authors support this conclusion, including 
modern Dutch jurists.54 The fact that Huber’s third axiom provides no authority in Roman law 
does not necessarily mean that it does not derive from Roman law or necessarily form part of 
the ius gentium. As Huber explains: 
 
It often happens that transactions entered into in one place have force and effect in a different 
country or are judicially decided upon in another place. It is well known, furthermore, that after 
the breaking up of the provinces of the Roman Empire and the division of the Christian world 
into almost innumerable nations, being not subject one to the other, nor sharing the same mode 
of government, the laws of the different nations disagree in many respects. It is not surprising 
that there is nothing in the Roman law on the subject inasmuch as the Roman dominion, 
covering as it did all parts of the globe and ruling the same with a uniform law, could not give 
rise to a conflict of different laws. The fundamental rules according to which this question 
should be decided must be found, however, in the Roman law itself. Although the matter 
belongs rather to the law of nations than to the civil law, it is manifest that what the different 
nations observe among themselves belongs to the law of nations. For the purpose of solving the 
subtlety of this most intricate question, we shall lay down three axioms which being conceded 
as they should be everywhere will smooth our way for the solution of the remaining questions. 
 
It follows, therefore, that the solution of the problem must be derived not exclusively from the 
civil law, but from convenience and the tacit consent of nations. Although the laws of one nation 
can have no force directly within another, yet nothing could be more inconvenient to commerce 
and to international usage than that transactions valid by the law of one place should be rendered 
of no effect elsewhere on account of a difference in the law. And that is the reason for the third 
maxim concerning which hitherto no doubt appears to have been entertained.55 
 
 Huber is not out of line with other civil law jurists in taking this approach. In exactly 
the same way, Bartolus, who sought to build a system of private international law between free 
Italian cities, based his position on Roman law despite its lack of authority. Indeed, if the law 
was to grow and meet new challenges not faced by the Romans, then it was necessary for jurists 
to use such an approach. Of course, as Huber knew, he was not going to find any authority in 
Roman law for comity because the Romans did not recognize foreign legal systems or different 
conceptions of justice.56 
If this interpretation is correct, there is a skillful sleight-of-hand in all this. Huber starts 
by admitting that his third axiom did not exist in Roman law. But he claims that because his 
third axiom is self-evident and has never been doubted, it forms part of the ius gentium – it is 
accepted everywhere. Huber does not make it easy though, for he provides no evidence that his 
third axiom is accepted everywhere. But he argues that he does not need to because his third 
                                                        
53 Ibid., p. 15. 
54 See Watson, note 42 above; Kollewijn, note 45 above, p. 133; Theodorous de Boer, "Living Apart Together: 
The Relationship Between Public and Private International Law", Netherlands International Law Review, LVII 
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55 Lorenzen, note 48 above, pp. 226-227. 
56 Yntema, note 1 above, p. 26; Watson, note 42 above, p. 6; Alan Watson, The Making of the Civil Law (1981), 
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axiom is exactly that – an “axiom” – a rule that requires no proof because it is self-evident and 
not open to question.57 
Huber’s first and second axioms are to the effect that the laws of a State are not directly 
binding beyond its territory. His third axiom would thus be to the effect that, subject to the 
exception that foreign law would cause prejudice to a State or its citizens, every State is bound 
to recognize foreign law by way of comity. Under this interpretation, foreign law is therefore 
recognized, but indirectly, so there is no conflict between axioms one and two, on one hand, 
and axiom three, on the other. By recognizing the authority of another State by consent rather 
than compulsion, States facilitate international commerce whilst preserving their sovereignty.58 
There is another possible source for Huber’s obligation to act with comity which we 
suggest has the most support on a reading of his De conflictu legum and associated works. By 
including the word will, yet failing to provide authority for his third axiom as part of the ius 
gentium, Huber may have conceived of his third axiom as giving rise to an imperfect obligation.  
This interpretation is supported – to a certain extent – by the work of Justice Story (discussed 
below), who considered the nature of the obligation to act with comity in in his Commentaries 
on the Conflict of Laws.59 
The distinction between perfect and imperfect obligations was well known, not only to 
philosophers of the time, but also to the jurists of the Dutch School.60 Grotius, whose work 
greatly influenced Huber, wrote of the distinction in De jure belli ac pacis, as did other legal 
theorists before and during Huber’s time. Indeed, imperfect obligations began their life as 
imperfect rights in the work of Grotius.61 Although he wrote after Huber’s death, Vattel 
succinctly summarized the distinction between perfect and imperfect obligations in Le Droit 
des gens.62 Drawing a parallel between the relations of free men and sovereign States, Vattel 
wrote of the distinction between perfect and imperfect obligations as follows: 
 
To understand this properly we must note that obligations and the corresponding rights … are 
distinguished into internal and external.  Obligations are internal in so far as they bind the 
conscience and are deduced from the rules of our duty; they are external when considered 
relatively to other men as producing some right on their part.  Internal obligations are always 
the same in nature, though they may vary in degree; external obligations, however, are divided 
into perfect and imperfect, and the rights they give rise to are likewise perfect and imperfect.  
Perfect rights are those which carry with them the right of compelling the fulfilment of the 
corresponding obligation; imperfect rights cannot so compel.  Perfect obligations are those 
which give rise to the right of enforcing them; imperfect obligations give but the right to request. 
 
It will now be easily understood why a right is always imperfect when the corresponding 
obligation depends upon the judgment of him who owes it; for if he could be constrained in 
                                                        
57 In Praelectiones juris romani et hodierni, Huber explain what he means by an “axiom”, a term he borrowed 
from the study of mathematics. Axioms, he declared, are nothing more than self-evident truths. They require no 
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60 Watson, note 42 above, p. 21. 
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557. 
62 Emer de Vattel, Le Droit Des Gens, Ou Principes de La Loi Naturelle, Appliqués à La Conduite et Aux 
Affaires Des Nations et Des Souverains (1758). Vattel’s work is more commonly known by its shorter English 
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Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, transl. B. Fenwick (1916), p. 137. 
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such a case he would cease to have the right of deciding what are his obligations according to 
the law of conscience.63 
 
Thus, an obligation, and its corresponding right, are external whenever each is vested in a 
different subject – that is, where Party A has an obligation to perform some act and Party B has 
the correlative right that Party A perform that obligation. Yet, external obligations may be 
perfect or imperfect depending on who has the authority or capacity to judge the existence and 
nature of the obligation. 
If the person who is obliged also has the authority or capacity to judge the existence and 
nature of the obligation they are to perform – if he has “the right of deciding what are his 
obligations according to the law of conscience” – then he is only imperfectly obliged, and his 
counterpart has only an imperfect right to request that he fulfil that obligation. As long as a 
person retains the authority to judge himself, the obligation remains imperfect. If, however, the 
person who claims a right can also judge the existence and nature of the obligation, or if a third 
person has authority or capacity to do the same, then we have a case of a perfect obligation and 
a perfect corresponding right. 
External obligations and rights arise because we are required to interact with others in 
order to pursue our own greater advantage. As Vattel explains, since man originally entered the 
state of nature as free and independent, he remains the judge of his obligations towards others. 
For the same reason, he has no authority to judge what others owe to him in a manner perfectly 
binding them. A perfect obligation, and corresponding right, may then only be created if, by 
free will, a person alienates his authority or capacity to judge his own duties and obligations 
and transfers it as an additional right to the party which originally had the imperfect right of 
demanding the fulfilment of the obligation or to a third person. This transfer of the right of 
judgment is the essence of contract. Properly speaking, there are no perfect rights and 
obligations in the state of nature.64 
In the same way, sovereign States exist in a state of nature. Yet, in order to pursue their 
own greater advantage, they must interact. As Huber was acutely aware, the prosperity of the 
United Netherlands depended on its ability to promote international trade and commerce. These 
interactions of course, create obligations, and corresponding rights, which may be either perfect 
or imperfect in nature. As perfect obligations may only be created by contract, States can be 
said to have a perfect obligation to recognize international law – which we are told is based on 
their tacit consent. Thus, if one were to accept that Huber considered comity to form part of the 
ius gentium, then comity could be said to give rise to a perfect obligation – that is, an obligation 
capable of being enforced not just in the forum of conscience. 
However, we suggest that Huber likely considered comity to give rise to an imperfect 
obligation. In this sense, every State would be considered to have an obligation to act with 
comity which derives from the mutual benefit of international commerce and from the 
inconvenience that would result from a contrary doctrine. Yet, sovereignty implies that the 
obligation to act with comity will always be imperfect. Every State has the right to judge for 
itself the nature and extent of its obligation to act with comity towards the authority of other 
States according to the laws of its own conscience. 
Under this interpretation, Huber’s conception of comity differs to that advanced by the 
Voets. For the Voets, there is certainly no obligation to act with comity. Comity is simply a 
means by which a State can, if it so chooses, recognize the authority of another. If, however, 
Huber conceived of comity as giving rise to an imperfect obligation, then States have an 
obligation to act with comity. The obligation is imperfect – that is, incapable of being enforced 
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by others – but it is an obligation nonetheless.  At most, the correlative right of such an imperfect 
obligation entitles one State to ask another to recognize their laws and judicial acts, but it does 
not given them a right to demand in a manner consistent with a perfect right. 
This means that although States have a duty to act with comity, exactly how they 
discharge that duty is within their discretion. Perfect obligations, such as the obligation to keep 
a promise, do not provide us with such discretion. The obligation to repay a loan, for example, 
obliges the borrower to repay the precise amount agreed upon, to a specific person, often at a 
specific time. Conversely, imperfect obligations like beneficence, charity, gratitude, mercy, or 
comity for that matter, all carry with them a certain discretion. Most think that whereas the 
obligation to be charitable requires us to give something to the needy, it does not require that 
we give a set amount, and it does not require that we donate to any particular person or 
organization. Similarly, whereas we may be obliged to be merciful, that obligation does not 
specify the form our mercy must take, nor exactly when or to whom we must exhibit it. In the 
same vein, if Huber considered comity to give rise to an imperfect obligation, he meant for 
States to be obliged to act with comity. As with all imperfect obligations, he must have 
considered it within the discretion of each State to determine, in accordance with its own 
conscience, how it would exhibit comity towards the authority of other States. 
Short of waking Huber from the dead, we may never know how he conceived of his 
third axiom. We suggest he likely conceived of it as giving rise to an imperfect obligation.  
Thus, although he envisaged his first two axioms to give rise to perfect obligations forming part 
of the ius gentium, he conceived of his third as an imperfect obligation whose fulfilment was to 
lay within the discretion of individual States. Such an interpretation is in keeping with the 
positivist progression towards the growing absolutism of sovereignty at the time and the 
pressing need to form a basis by which to recognize foreign law. 
As we will see below, it was Huber’s conception of comity, rather than the Voets, that 
would later find favor in other jurisdictions. In the common law, Huber was relied upon more 
than any other jurist to developed conflict of law rules and doctrines. As Lorenzen noted: 
 
Of the vast number of treatises on the Conflict of Laws Huber’s “De Conflictu Legum 
Diversarum Imperiis” is the shortest. It covers only five quarto pages; and yet it has had a greater 
influence upon the development of the Conflict of Laws in England and the United States than 
any other work. No other foreign work has been so frequently cited.65 
 
 Comity’s place at the center of United States and English private international law is 
hardly surprising. Huber conceived of comity, not as a stand alone principle, but rather as a 
theoretical basis upon which to build concrete rules and doctrines of law. At the time of its 
inception in the common law, the United States and England required – to varying degrees – a 
principle by which they could build an array of conflict rules and doctrines. Campbell 
McLachlan wrote that comity was an attractive principle for this purpose:  
 
Huber, Voet and the jurists that followed them in the modern Conflict of Laws used the concept 
of comity as a springboard from which they proceeded to develop a highly organized and 
sophisticated set of choice of law rules.  In this sense, “comity” did not remain a vague 
desideratum – an invitation to replace law with its antithesis in mere courtesy and discretion.  
On the contrary, it supplied the basis for the elaboration of a detailed set of positive rules, 
grounded in practical reality.66 
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 Indeed, those of the Dutch School developed advanced conflict rules based on the twin 
concepts of sovereignty and comity. In De conflictu legum, Huber notes that his three axioms 
were intended to “smooth” the way for the resolution of all conflict of law problems.67 Using 
them as a base, he went on to develop concrete rules and doctrines that would later guide not 
only the courts of Friesland, but courts around the world. Although comity is vague in the 
abstract, Huber demonstrated that it could be used to develop positive rules and doctrines of 
law aimed at regulating how States ought to act with respect of each other’s authority. 
 
Comity in the Common Law 
 
 Comity was most famously introduced to the common law world by the American jurist 
Justice Joseph Story in the early nineteenth century. Much like Huber, Story sought to rely on 
the twin concepts of sovereignty and comity to develop a new system of private international 
law capable of reconciling the political need for sovereignty and the commercial need for 
international and interstate commerce in the United States. Yet, in adapting the principle for the 
American context, Story increasingly focused on the connection between comity and justice.  
To Story, the obligation to act with comity derived not only from the commercial need to 
promote international commerce among sovereign States, but also from each State’s paramount 
duty to do justice to those subject to their own authority. 
This idea that States ought to act with comity “for reasons of justice” was continued, 
most notably, under Lord Mansfield and John Westlake in England. When comity was received 
in England, the country was already a major trading nation. Yet, at the time, English courts 
were unable to recognize foreign law or grant relief in cases with a foreign element. To remedy 
the obvious injustice that would result from always applying English law, or from withholding 
relief all together, Mansfield adopted comity to permit English courts to recognize foreign law 
in circumstances where it would be just to do so. 
However, unlike Story, Mansfield and Westlake repositioned the source of the 
obligation to act with comity solely within each State’s paramount duty to do justice to those 
subject to their own authority. In effect, they detached comity from any concern it had with the 
promotion of international commerce or as a principle founded on the mutual benefit of States. 
To Mansfield and Westlake, private citizens would continue to engage in international 
commerce regardless of whether English courts recognised foreign law. The question was 
therefore one of achieving justice within the Westphalian political-legal framework of 
sovereign States. For them, States ought to act with comity not because it is in their mutual 
commercial interest, but rather because, in certain cases, it will be more just to recognize foreign 
law or judgements than apply one’s own domestic law or withhold relief entirely. 
 
Justice Joseph Story 
 
 Huber’s conception of comity was adapted for the common law world most famously 
by Justice Joseph Story (1779-1845).  Story, a Professor at Harvard University and an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, sought to rely on the twin concepts of 
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sovereignty and comity to develop a new system of private international law for the United 
States.68 In his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws,69 Story endorsed Huber writing: 
 
Some attempts have been made, without any success, to undervalue the authority of Huberus…  
But it will require very little aid of authority to countenance his merits …  It is not, however, a 
slight recommendation of his works, that hitherto he has possessed an undisputed 
recommendation preference on this subject over other continental jurists, as well as in England 
as in America.70 
 
 Just as Huber, Story saw comity as a means of reconciling sovereignty with the need for 
international and interstate commerce. And, just as comity had done in the United Netherlands, 
Story believed it would contribute to the greater prosperity of a newly federated United States.71 
Adopting Huber’s three axioms, Story set about building a system of private international law 
capable of resolving both international and internal conflicts of authority.72 Elaborating on each 
axiom in greater detail, Story wrote: 
 
It is an essential attribute of every sovereign that it has no admitted superior, and that it gives 
the supreme law within its own dominions on all subjects appertaining to its sovereignty. What 
it yields, it is its own choice to yield; and it cannot be commanded by another to yield it as a 
matter of right. And, accordingly, it is laid down by all publicists and jurists, as an incontestable 
rule of public law, that one may with impunity disregard the law pronounced by a magistrate 
beyond his own territory …73 
 
But of the nature, and extent, and utility of this recognition of foreign laws, respecting the state 
and conditions of persons, every nation must judge for itself, and certainly is not bound to 
recognise them, when they would be prejudicial to its own interest. The very terms, in which 
the doctrine [of comity] is commonly enunciated, carry along with them this necessary 
qualification and limitation of it…  It is, therefore, in the strictest sense, a matter of the comity 
of nations, and not of any absolute paramount obligation, superseding all discretion on the 
subject. 
 
It has been thought by some jurists that the term, ‘comity’, is not sufficiently expressive of the 
obligation of nations to give effect to foreign laws, when they are not prejudicial to their own 
rights and interests ... And it has been suggested, that the doctrine rests on a deeper foundation; 
that it is not so much a matter of comity, or courtesy, as of paramount moral duty. Now, 
assuming, that such a moral duty does exist, it is clearly one of imperfect obligation, like that 
of beneficence, humanity, and charity. Every nation must be the final judge for itself, not only 
of the nature and the extent of the duty, but of the occasions, on which its exercise may be justly 
demanded. 
                                                        
68 Early United States decisions demonstrate that comity was received long before Story turned his attention to 
the subject. Yet, it was Story’s academic and judicial stature that lent unprecedented credibility to the idea of 
comity as a means to recognize foreign authority in the United States. See Kurt Nadelmann, "Joseph Story’s 
Contribution to American Conflicts Law: A Comment", American Journal of Legal History, V (1961), pp. 230-
231. 
69 Story, note 59 above. 
70 Ibid., p. 32. 
71 Story was acutely aware that the United States was in an analogous position to the United Netherlands in this 
regard. “To no part of the world is [comity] of more interest and importance than to the United States, since the 
union of a national government with already that of twenty-six distinct states, and in some respects independent 
states, necessarily creates very complicated private relations and rights between the citizens of those states ...”. 
Ibid., p. 9. 
72 Elliott Cheatham, "American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility", Harvard Law Review, 
LVIII (1945), p. 376; Childress, note 32 above, p. 24; Beale, note 29 above, p. 24. 
73 Story, note 59 above, p. 8. 
 18 
 
The true foundation, on which the administration of international law must rest, is, that the rules, 
which are to govern, are those, which arise from mutual interest and utility, from a sense of the 
inconveniences, which would result from a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of moral necessity 
to do justice … There is then not only no impropriety in the use of the phrase ‘comity of nations,’ 
but it is the most appropriate phrase to express the true foundation and extent of the obligation 
of the laws of one nation within the territories of another.74 
 
 Just as Huber, Story’s theory reflects the importance of sovereignty, acknowledging that 
each State has the right to self-determination and non-interference. To be sure, no State can 
command another “as a matter of right” to recognize their authority – be that their laws or the 
judgements of their courts.  Yet, Story considered States to have an obligation to act with comity 
– an imperfect obligation that derives, not only from the mutual benefit and utility of 
international commerce, but also from “a sort of moral necessity to do justice”.75 
As with all imperfect obligations, Story argued that each State has the discretion to 
determine the nature and extent of its obligation to act with comity – to determine exactly how 
and when it will exhibit comity. Citing Vattel’s discussion on the nature of imperfect 
obligations, Story wrote: 
 
… it belongs exclusively to each nation to form its own judgement of what its conscience 
prescribes to it; of what it can, or cannot do; of what is proper, or improper for it to do.  And of 
course it rests solely with it to examine and determine whether it can perform any office for 
another nation, without neglecting the duty which is owes to itself.76 
 
 Elaborating on the nature of the obligation to act with comity, Story continually stressed 
comity’s concern with justice. To Story, part of a State’s “conscience” must necessarily be 
preoccupied with its duty to do justice to those subject to its own authority. In this sense, Story 
considered the principle of comity to “to stand upon just principles”77 and to derive, not only 
from the mutual benefit and utility of international commerce, but also from each States’ 
paramount duty to do justice to those subject to their own authority. 
As an imperfect obligation, no State can demand “as a matter of right” the recognition 
of its laws or the judgements of its courts within the territory of another. But, “every nation 
must judge for itself what is its true duty in the administration of justice in its domestic 
tribunals”.78 In certain circumstances, it will be more just to recognize foreign law than simply 
apply domestic law to every case with a foreign element. In such cases, States, and their courts, 
have a duty to recognize foreign law. In Story’s mind, a failure to do so will necessarily amount 
to a failure to do justice – the primary duty of every State through it courts. By focusing on 
justice, Story repositioned the source of the obligation to act with comity – moving it away 
from the mutual commercial benefit of States to include judicial concerns. 
Drawing on the twin concepts of sovereignty and comity, Story developed a complex 
system of conflict rules for the American context. Much like Huber’s De conflictu legum, Story 
set out his understanding of comity at the beginning of his Commentaries before drawing upon 
the principle time and again to develop concrete and sophisticated rules and doctrines of law.  
                                                        
74 Ibid., pp. 34–37. 
75 Ibid., p. 36. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid., p. 37. 
78 Ibid., p. 34. 
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By harnessing comity’s flexibility in the abstract, Story developed fine-grained positive rules 
and doctrines of law aimed at regulating specific types of cases.79 
United States judicial decisions immediately after the publication of Story’s 
Commentaries demonstrate that comity was well received by the courts. Only five years after 
publication, the Supreme Court of the United States adopted Story’s conception of comity in 
Bank of Augusta v Earle80 and, together with lower courts, has applied the principle ever since.  
The courts paid less attention to the idea that the source of their obligation to act with comity 
was to be found in the mutual commercial benefit of States. Rather, they drew on comity to 




 Across the Atlantic, England’s unified legal system was not a fertile ground for thinking 
on questions of private international law. Unlike the United Netherlands or the United States, 
the English common law was the product of a powerful centralized court system that extended 
throughout the realm. By this time, England was a major trading nation and Englishmen 
commonly travelled to foreign shores. There they acquired property, entered into contracts, 
committed crimes, and suffered injury. But the common law, which had developed to meet the 
needs of a feudal society, was not attuned to legal problems posed by international relations.  
In English courts, jurors had to be drawn from the locality of the disputed action or thing. And, 
as the courts were powerless to empanel foreign jurors, they were forced to dismiss cases that 
required the determination of facts that had materialised beyond the realm. Plaintiffs were left 
to seek redress abroad.81 
To address this situation English lawyers would often resort to a typical common law 
ruse. A plaintiff who had been maimed in Hamburg, for example, would plead that that the city 
was situated in England, and the courts accepted such allegations so that the parties had access 
to some level of justice.82 Because the matter was held to have “occurred” in England, there 
was no need to recognize foreign authority because the applicable law would always be English 
law. 
This fiction was soon revealed for what it was, and the courts were aware that the 
application of English law to every dispute would lead to injustice. There was thus a judicial 
need to recognize foreign laws and judgements in England. Yet, the courts had yet to develop 
any means by which to do so. Because English courts had not dealt with the issue previously, 
the origins of what would later become English conflict of laws had to be found outside of 
England.83 In Potinger v Wightman84 Sir Samuel Romilly declared that, with respect to such 
matters, he was compelled to draw upon the work of civil jurists: 
 
Of authority on this subject, in the English law, none exist … but it has been much discussed 
by foreign jurists, to whose opinions in the absence of domestic authorities our courts are 
accustomed to resort on questions which (like the present) must be decided rather by general 
principles of law, than by the peculiar doctrines of any local code.85 
                                                        
79 “Before entering upon any examination of the various heads, which a treaties upon the Conflict of Laws will 
naturally embrace, it seems necessary to advert to a few general maxims or axioms, which constitute the basis, 
upon which all reasoning on the subject must necessarily rest ...”. Ibid., p. 19. 
80 Bank of Augusta v Earle., 38 U.S. 519 (1839) (US SC). 
81 Gene Shreve and Hannah Buxbaum, A Conflict of Laws Anthology (2d ed.; 2010), pp. 16–17. 
82 See, for example, Ward’s Case (1625) 82 Eng Rep 245 (KB) 246 (Justice Doderidge). 
83 D. J. Llewelyn Davies, "The Influence of Huber’s De Conflictu Legum on English Private International Law", 
British Year Book of International Law, XVIII (1937), pp. 50-52. 
84 Potinger v Wightman (1817) 3 Mer 67 (Rolls Ct.). 
85 Ibid., p. 72. 
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 It was the Dutch School to which they turned.86 A noticeable feature of English conflict 
of law decisions during the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth century is the frequency 
with which Huber is cited.87 Chancellor James Kent noted that when the question of recognizing 
foreign authority “was first introduced in Westminster Hall, the only work which attracted 
attention was a tract by Huberus entitled De conflictu legume”.88 
The introduction of Huber’s conception of comity into English law was likely facilitated 
by the close relations that existed between Scotland and the United Netherlands at the time and 
Scotland’s later union with England. Many Scottish intellectuals – denied opportunities at 
English universities as dissenters during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – studied law 
at Leiden, Utrecht, and Franeker, where the Voets and Huber lectured. The frequent practice 
adopted by Scottish jurists during this time was to complete their legal studies at these 
universities before returning home. In all likelihood they would have been directly acquainted 
with the ideas of the Dutch School.89 
This proposition is supported by evidence that comity originally received greater 
attention in Scotland than it did in England.90 And, when the 1707 Treaty of the Union was 
concluded between England and Scotland, the ideas of the Dutch School were likely imported 
by Scottish jurists into English law. Huber’s three axioms were an attractive theory for English 
jurists who were wrestling with the question of how to recognize foreign authority in England. 
It is perhaps no coincidence that credit for the introduction and early development of 
comity in England is generally afforded to a Scotsman – William Murray, better known as Lord 
Mansfield (1707-1793). Through a series of judgements, Mansfield, a Scottish jurist and later 
Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, rejected the Statutist approach for the foundation of 
English conflict of laws, instead favoring Huber’s twin concepts of sovereignty and comity.91  
In Holman v Johnson92 Mansfield held: 
 
I am very glad the old books have been looked into. The doctrine Huberus lays down, is founded 
in good sense, and upon general principles of justice. I entirely agree with him.93 
 
 Just as Story, Mansfield appears to have considered States to have an imperfect 
obligation to act with comity. And, like Story, he considered that obligation to derive from each 
State’s paramount duty to do justice. Yet, Mansfield took comity’s concern with justice further 
than Story. Whereas Story considered the obligation to act with comity to derive from the 
mutual benefit of international commerce to States and from each State’s duty to do justice, 
Mansfield considered the obligation to derive solely from the latter. 
Mansfield would developed this conception of comity through a number of important 
cases – the most notable of which was Somerset’s case.94 In that case Mansfield was called 
                                                        
86 Davies, note 83 above, p. 52. 
87 See, for example, Robinson v Bland (1760) 2 Burr 1077 (KB); Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341 (KB); 
Hog v Lashley (1792) 6 Br PC 550 (KB); Potinger v Wightman  (1817) 3 Mer 67 (Rolls Ct.); British Linen Co v 
Drummond (1830) 10 B & C 903 (KB); De La Vega v Vianna (1830) 1 B & Ad 284 (KB); Huber v Steiner 
(1835) 2 Bing NC 202 (KB); Don v Lippmann (1837) 5 Cl & F 1 (HL); Leroux v Brown (1852) 12 CB 801 (Ct. 
CP). 
88 James Kent, A Practical Treatise on Commercial and Maritime Law (1837), p. 371. 
89 John Westlake, A Treatise on Private International Law with Principal Reference to Its Practice in England 
(6th ed.; 1922), pp. 7–8; Davies, note 83 above, p. 53. 
90 Andrew Gibb, International Private Law in Scotland in the XVIth and XVIIth Centuries (1928).  See also, 
Balfour v Balfour (1793) 6 Br PC 500 (KB), where the leading Scottish decisions on comity are cited. 
91 Cecil Fifoot, Lord Mansfield (1936), p. 35; Davies, note 83 above, p. 52; Kent, note 88 above, p. 371. 
92 Holman v Johnson (1775) 1 Cowp 341 (KB). 
93 Ibid., pp. 344-345 (Lord Mansfield). 
94 Somerset v Stewart (1772) 98 ER 499 (KB). 
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upon to decide the fate of a slave who had been born in the United States. At that time, slavery 
was legal in the United States but not in England. Somerset, who had sailed to London with his 
master, argued that in England he was no longer a slave, and his legal counsel argued that, 
under Huber’s third axiom, an English court need not “recognize” foreign law within its 
territory if it would be prejudicial to England or the duty it owes to those subject to its authority.  
Applying Huber’s third axiom, Mansfield held that although non-recognition would likely 
cause “inconvenience”, United States slavery laws were “so odious” that comity would not 
extend to their recognition in England.95 
Just as Story, Mansfield made it clear that whereas every State ought to act with comity, 
the obligation to do so can only ever be imperfect. This implied that it is within the discretion 
of each State to determine the nature and extent of its duty to act with comity towards the 
authority of others. Referring to Huber’s third axiom, Mansfield held that slavery was but one 
example of a situation where foreign law would not be recognized because it was prejudicial to 
England and those subject to its own authority – in essence, it would require English courts to 
subvert their own duty to do justice. This included the duty to do justice to Somerset who, as a 
temporary alien in England, was subject to the authority of the English courts. 
In recognizing that the decision may result in “inconvenience”, Mansfield effectively 
detached the obligation to act with comity from State interests. To Mansfield, States do not act 
with comity for reasons of mutual commercial benefit. Rather, they act with comity purely for 
“reasons of justice”. In circumstances where it would be more “just” that foreign law be 
recognized, so that a dispute is subject to foreign law rather than English law, courts ought to 
act with comity to recognize such law. In circumstances where it would be more “just” to apply 
English law, comity does not require courts recognize foreign law but rather than they apply 
English law to resolve the dispute. Because the source of the obligation to act with comity is 
found in the court’s duty to do justice, the effect on international commerce or on the mutual 
benefit or convenience of States becomes a subsidiary concern. 
The idea that courts ought to act with comity for reasons of justice was adopted by 
English courts and scholars. For the courts, comity provided them with a new means to 
recognize foreign law in circumstances where the application of English law would ordinarily 
lead to injustice. Writing in 1767, Lord Kames, who dedicated his Principles of Equity to 
Mansfield, wrote of the reasons for comity as follows: 
 
… though a statute has no coercive authority as such extra territorium, it becomes necessary, 




 The idea that States ought to act with comity for reasons of justice was advanced further 
by John Westlake (1828-1893), a barrister and professor at the University of Cambridge. In his 
Treatise on Private International Law,97 Westlake traced the origins of English conflict of laws, 
.noting that once English courts abandoned their earlier practice of resorting only to English 
law to decide cases with a foreign element, they filled the void with the principle of comity. In 
his words, there was a “reception in England of continental maxims on the topic of private 
international law”98 – the most influential of which was Huber’s comity.99 
                                                        
95 Ibid., pp. 510 (Lord Mansfield). 
96 Henry Home, Principles of Equity (2d ed.; 1767), p. 346. 
97 Westlake, note 89 above. 
98 Ibid., p. 10. 
99 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
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Although Westlake is generally praised for introducing continental theory into English 
law, he rejected the international elements of Story’s approach – in particular his comparative 
methodology and reliance on foreign authority. Unlike Story, Westlake largely confined his 
study to English judicial decisions because he considered private international law to be a 
“department of English law”.100 To Westlake, conflict rules are an instance of domestic 
sovereignty and thus any duty to recognize foreign law must be found internally within English 
law itself. On the obligation to act with comity, Westlake wrote: 
 
Now since private international law is administered by national courts, it follows that each court 
must apply any solution of these questions which its own national law may be found to 
prescribe.  And the national law is very likely to contain an answer to the question under what 
conditions an action is maintainable in its own courts, while it may probably be silent with 
regard to the law according to which any particular action is to be decided, or to the validity to 
be allowed to foreign judgements.  What then is to be inferred from the silence of the national 
law on these topics?  The inference that the national law itself must always be applied, and that 
no validity is to be allowed to foreign judgments, would have led to practical results so shocking 
to all notions of justice that it has never been drawn it has been regularly assumed that the 
national law tacitly adopts some maxims according to which foreign laws and foreign judgments 
are sometimes admitted to be of force.101 
 
 Westlake made clear that the obligation to act with comity arises because the application 
of domestic law would, in many cases, lead to results that are “shocking to all notions of 
justice”. Considering the obligation further, he noted that since the time of Mansfield, the 
English conception of comity had always been different from that advanced by the Voets and 
Huber. 
 
While English writers and judges freely borrowed the term ‘comity’ from John Voet and Huber, 
it may be doubted whether they meant it strictly in a sense independent of justice.  Although on 
the continent comity and justice are usually regarded as forming an antithesis, it is probable that 
in this country the prevailing view has been that while a concession is made in not determining 
every question by the lex fori, that concession is dictated not only by a convenience amounting 
to necessity, but also by deference to a science of law embodying justice, which the law of the 
land was deemed to have adopted as governing its own interpretation and application, and from 
which it was conceived that the rules of comity were drawn.102 
 
 Just as Mansfield, Westlake thus tied the idea of comity to justice – in his view the rules 
of comity were drawn from the “science of law embodying justice”. He noted later in his 
Treatise that “if the notion of comity was ever radically different from that of justice, it has now 
been completely merged in the latter”.103 Just as Mansfield then, Westlake considered that 
courts have an obligation to act with comity – the source of that obligation being their primary 
duty to resolve matters according to the rules of justice.  Yet, as private international law – and 
comity as part thereof – form a purely domestic branch of law, the nature and extent of the 
obligation to act with comity is a question for each State. As an imperfect obligation, it is up to 
each State to determine how and under what circumstances it will be just to recognize the 
authority of another. 
 
Conclusions 
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 Comity was created to reconcile two competing paradigms that emerged after the Thirty 
Years War – the rise of the sovereign State and the need to promote international commerce.  
For a newly independent United Netherlands, comity was seen as fundamental to its continued 
prosperity as one of the world’s foremost trading nations. By drawing on the concept of comity, 
Dutch jurists sought to resolve the vexed question of how, and under what circumstances, 
formally equal sovereign States ought to recognise each other’s authority within their territory. 
Since its creation, comity has undergone significant change. What started as a 
discretionary exception to the doctrine of sovereignty deriving from the mutual benefit and 
convenience of States later became an (imperfect) obligation deriving from each State’s 
paramount duty to do justice to those subject to their own authority. Indeed, the history of 
comity demonstrate that courts act with, or ought to act with comity to recognize each other’s 
authority solely “for reasons of justice”. The principle embodies the idea that although every 
State is sovereign, often the most just exercise of one State’s authority will in fact be to 
recognize the authority of another. 
If we are to attain a right understanding of modern principles, it is vital that we 
understand the reasons for which they were created and how they have developed over time.  
This article has sought to understand the principle of comity through a historical lens by 
analyzing the events and ideas of those most influential to its development. It is hoped that this 
article will shed new light on comity and open the door to new ways of thinking about the 
principle in practice. 
 
